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
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file: Cong Solarz
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State Dept. review completed

TOKYO FOR CODEL SOLARZ

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 04/12/02 (DEAN, JOHN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, TH, US, OREP
SUBJECT: CODEL SOLARZ MEETING WITH MARSHAL SITTHI

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: THE HIGHLIGHT OF CODEL SOLARZ' VISIT TO THAILAND APRIL 9 TO 11 WAS A WORKING BREAKFAST HOSTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI, WITH THAI NSC SEC GEN PRASONG AND SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS ALSO PRESENT. CAMBODIAN ISSUES DOMINATED THE DISCUSSION. THE THAI BROKE NO NEW GROUND, BUT RESTATED THEIR STRONG DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON A COALITION OF KHMER RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS. SITTHI SAW A COALITION AS IMPORTANT TO SAFEGUARD THE DK'S UN SEAT, TO CREATE A CHANNEL FOR OUTSIDE AID TO THE RESISTANCE, AND TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HANOI TO TALK TO THE DK (BY GIVING SON SANN A DK HAT). SITTHI DOES NOT THINK THE VIETNAMESE CAN CRUSH THE RESISTANCE NOR DOES HE SEE AN EARLY POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SIGHT. THE VIETNAMESE WILL HOLD ON BUT, SITTHI ARGUED STRONGLY, THAILAND MUST CONTINUE TO RESIST ANY VIETNAMESE CONSOLIDATION IN CAMBODIA. TURNING TO OTHER ISSUES, SOLARZ' QUESTIONING

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GENERATED LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF PIRACY SUPPRESSION ISSUES AND THE PENDING UNHCR PROGRAM PROPOSAL. THE THAI STRESSED A NUMBER OF LEGAL QUESTIONS, BUT THEIR BOTTOM LINE SEEMED TO BE READINESS TO WORK WITH THE UNHCR IF THE UPCOMING WRITTEN PRESENTATION PROVES ACCEPTABLE IN DETAIL. ON REFUGEES, PRASONG APPEALED FOR RESETTLEMENT OF HMONG AND LAO WHO HAVE BEEN IN CAMPS NOW FOR YEARS, AS WELL AS OF KHMER, WHO FOR SOME TIME HAVE BEEN BLOCKED FROM CONSIDERATION BY THE US. HE INDICATED HOPES THAT UNHCR-OVERSEEN VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION CAN ALSO GO AHEAD TO COMPLEMENT RESETTLEMENT AND DRAW DOWN THE CURRENT KHMER CAMP POPULATION. IN A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON "YELLOW RAIN," SITTHI SAID THE RTG WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE, BUT SHOULD STAY GENERALLY IN THE BACKGROUND. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING HIS APRIL 9 - 11 VISIT TO THAILAND, REPRESENTATIVE SOLARZ MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI AND SENIOR RTG OFFICIALS OVER BREAKFAST APRIL 10. ON THE THAI SIDE WERE MARSHAL SITTHI; DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ARUN; NSC SECRETARY GENERAL PRASONG; AMBASSADOR TO THE US PROK; DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PHIYA; DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD GENERAL CHAVALIT; UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS KASEM; DIRECTOR OF THE MFA IO DEPARTMENT SAROJ; DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MFA POLITICAL DEPARTMENT NITYA; MFA AMERICA DIVISION DIRECTOR VIKROM AND MARSHAL SITTHI'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT SAKTHIP. THE AMERICAN GUESTS INCLUDED MR. SOLARZ; AMBASSADOR DEAN, DCM ROY AND POLITICAL OFFICER CARNEY.

KHMER RESISTANCE

4. IN CAMBODIA, SITTHI FORESAW NO MAJOR CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SITUATION. THE VIETNAMESE ARE PRESSING A DRY-SEASON BORDER AREA OFFENSIVE WHICH HAS GIVEN THE KHMER ROUGE PROBLEMS. PAVN HAS LOGISTICS ADVANTAGES AND BETTER SOVIET ARMS. THEY SEEK TO WIPE OUT STRONGHOLDS IN WESTERN CAMBODIA CLOSE TO THE BORDER. DK-CONTROLLED CIVILIANS HAVE FLED INTO THAILAND BUT ONLY TEMPORARILY. THE DK HAS CALLED FOR REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE INTERIOR AND TAKEN LOSSES IN THE EFFORT TO DEFEND THEIR STRONGHOLDS. HOWEVER, THE KHMER ROUGE HAVE NOW CHANGED COMMANDERS. SITTHI SAID, IMPLYING A CHANGE ALSO IN TACTICS. DESPITE PAVN GAINS, THE VIETNAMESE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WIPE OUT THE KHMER, IN SITTHI'S VIEW. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD MET WITH KPNLF LEADER SON SANN WHO SAID HIS FORCES AT SOKH SAN HAD FLED IN MID-MARCH ONLY WHEN THEY RAN OUT OF AMMUNITION. THEY ONLY LOST SEVEN KILLED, BUT SAID THEY INFLICTED CASUALTIES ON THE VIETNAMESE.

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5. SITTHI BELIEVES THAT BOTH THE KPNLF AND SIHANOUK'S FORCES ARE POTENTIALLY VIABLE. HE ALSO DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE KHMER ROUGE MIGHT CHANGE IF VIETNAMESE FORCES WITHDRAW. ON BUILDING A NON-COMMUNIST FORCE HE NOTED THAT THREE ASEAN COUNTRIES ARE AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD GIVE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT. HE STATED THAT THAILAND IS READY TO GIVE SUPPORT EVEN BEFORE A COALITION IS FORMED AND CLOSELY QUESTIONED MR. SOLARZ ON US READINESS. SOLARZ SAID THAT IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER

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KPNLF NEEDS IF THEY REACHED THE POINT OF EXCEEDING ASEAN'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY. HE NOTED HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE KPNLF NEEDS LIGHT ARMS WHICH ARE WELL WITHIN ASEAN'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY. SITTHI OBSERVED HE WOULD NOT WANT KPNLF FORCES TO GROW "TOO BIG," AND ADDED THAT ASEAN WANTS TO SHOW THE VIETNAMESE THAT RESISTANCE FORCES EXIST AND WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT.

6. THE THAI FOREIGN MINISTER WENT ON TO REITERATE THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF A RESISTANCE COALITION. WITHOUT ONE HE SEES EROSION OF SUPPORT AT THE UN LEADING TO A VACANT SEAT, WHICH WOULD BE A STAGE ON THE WAY TO ACCEPTANCE OF HENG SAMRIN AT THE UNGA. THIS WOULD UNDERCUT THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF ASEAN ASSISTANCE TO KHMER RESISTANCE. A COALITION WOULD NOT ONLY FORESTALL THIS, AND EVEN ADD TO UNGA SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA, BUT ALSO PERMIT PRINCE SIHANOUK TO USE HIS INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD. RECRUITMENT FROM THE INTERIOR WOULD BE ENHANCED, SITTHI NOTED THAT EVEN NOW MEMBERS OF THE PRK ARMED FORCES ARE DESERTING TO BOTH THE KPNLF AND TO THE DK. SITTHI DENIED THAT THE UNGA MAJORITY WOULD HOLD WITHOUT A COALITION, COMMENTING THAT ASEAN LOBBYISTS IN 1981 HAD ASKED FOR ONE YEAR TO BRING A COALITION ABOUT. HE POINTED TO BELGIUM AND OTHER EEC COUNTRIES AS POTENTIAL DEFECTORS THIS YEAR IF NO COALITION COMES ABOUT.

7. SON SANN AND SITTHI MET APRIL 7. SITTHI NOTED THAT DEALING WITH THE KPNLF LEADER IS DIFFICULT. HE IS SINCERE BUT "CAUSES HEADACHES." SITTHI REITERATED TO SON SANN THAT HE MUST LOOK AT THE LARGER PICTURE AND SET UP THE COALITION BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MALAYSIA WOULD BE WILLING TO HOST A MEETING AFTER ELECTIONS. IN ANALYZING WHY EFFORTS TO FORM A COALITION FAILED LAST YEAR, SITTHI SUGGESTED THAT THE NON-COMMUNIST SIDE HAD NOT DONE ENOUGH HOMEWORK. THE KPNLF, HE CLAIMED, DID NOTHING AND THE THAI HAD TO DRAFT ALL THEIR PAPERS.

SETTLEMENT

8. SOLARZ OUTLINED THREE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A WESTERN AMBASSADOR IN HANOI A YEAR AGO COULD SEE THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWING FROM CAMBODIA: A SOVIET INSTRUCTION TO DO SO, WHICH IS NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECTABLE; A DESPERATE ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH IS NOT NOW THE CASE BY VIETNAMESE STANDARDS; AND A MUCH MORE POWERFUL RESISTANCE WHICH WOULD EXTRACT A HIGHER PRICE FOR OCCUPATION, WHICH STILL SEEMS DOUBTFUL. THE WESTERN AMBASSADOR THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION WILL NOT SOON BE REVERSED. COMMENTING ON THIS ANALYSIS, SITTHI AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ORDER THE VIETNAMESE OUT. HE NOTED THAT THAILAND NOT ONLY WANTS THE SOVIETS TO TELL THE VIETNAMESE TO LEAVE, BUT TO LEAVE THEMSELVES. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL CONTINUE TO AFFLICT VIETNAM; ECONOMIC ISOLATION IS JOINED TO POLITICAL ISOLATION AND ONLY RECENTLY ASEAN SUCCEEDED IN FORESTALLING A DOLLARS 31 MILLION OPEC LOAN TO VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THE USSR HAS FUNDED THE VIETNAMESE, THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN WHICH DRAIN RESOURCES.

9. IN A DIFFERENT VEIN, SITTHI SAID ASEAN HOPES TO GIVE THE VIETNAMESE A CHOICE OF KHMER INTER-LOCUTORS. HANOI WILL NOT TALK TO THE DK, BECAUSE

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THAT NOW MEANS TALKING TO POL POT. BUT, IN A COALITION, SON SANN WOULD BE PART OF THE DK. THE UN SYG'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AHMED BROUGHT BACK WORD FROM HANOI THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO TALKS WITH SON SANN.

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10. THE THAI HAVE CONSULTED WITH ALLIES AND HAVE OPENED A CHANNEL TO THE VIETNAMESE TO CLARIFY HANOI'S STATEMENTS AND INTENTIONS. SITTHI NOTED THAT THE FRENCH SUGGESTED HE TALK WITH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER THACH. HE OPINED THAT THE REASON FOR THE RENEWAL OF 200 MILLION FRANC OFFICIAL CREDITS IS TO GIVE THE FRENCH STATUS AS A MEDIATOR.

11. CONTINUING HIS EXPOSITION, SITTHI SAID THAILAND CANNOT AGREE TO AN ARRANGEMENT FOR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM CAMBODIA. THE THAI WILL NOT ACCEPT A DE FACTO MOVE OF THE VIETNAMESE FRONTIER TOWARD THAILAND. HE CITED ILLUSORY GAINS OF APPEASEMENT BEFORE WWII AND ARGUED THAT ACCEPTING RESULTS OF MILITARY CONQUEST WOULD ENSURE NEW VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION. HE ADDED HIS BELIEF THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOAL IS COLONIZATION OF CAMBODIA AND THAT THAILAND DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT TO "LIVE NEXT TO THAT," EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT VIETNAM WOULD LOOK TOWARD THAILAND AFTER IT CONSOLIDATED ITS POSITION IN CAMBODIA. SITTHI REITERATED THE POSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA THAT THE NATION SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED. THE THAI, HE UNDERScoreD, DO NOT CARE WHO LEADS CAMBODIA OR WHETHER IT IS FRIENDLY TO VIETNAM AS LONG AS THE KHMER THEMSELVES ARE FREE TO CHOOSE.

12. IN ANSWERING A QUESTION ABOUT DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA WITHIN ASEAN, SITTHI NOTED THAT THAILAND DOES NOT TRUST COMMUNISTS, CHINESE OR OTHERWISE, BUT MUST BE REALISTIC. HE BELIEVES THAT AS LONG AS THE CHINESE ARE COMMITTEED TO MODERNIZATION THEY WILL NOT BE CAUSING "TROUBLE." THEY HAVE AGREED THAT BANGKOK IS FREE TO DEAL WITH THE CPT. HE SAW CHINA'S DIFFERENCES WITH INDONESIA AS DERIVING FROM THE LATTER'S EXPERIENCE OF 1965, BUT HOPED THAT THEY WOULD TALK WITH THE PRC. IN ANY CASE, INDONESIA BACKS THAILAND ON THE NEED FOR ISOLATION OF VIETNAM BECAUSE THAILAND IS THE FRONT-LINE STATE. AS A FINAL NOTE, SITTHI SAID IF VIETNAM WERE TO ATTACK THAILAND, HE WOULD EXPECT AMERICAN MILITARY AID BECAUSE THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES ARE ALLIES. WHETHER THE CHINESE WOULD ADMINISTER A SECOND LESSON UNER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS UP TO THEM.

PIRACY

13. AFTER A FEW GENERAL REMARKS REAFFIRMING THAI OPPOSITION TO PIRACY AND DESIRE TO PROSECUTE PIRATES, SITTHI LEFT TO RECEIVE THE ARRIVING BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTER. SQUADRON LEADER PRASONG AND MFA IO DEPARTMENT HEAD SAROJ CARRIED THE DISCUSSION FURTHER ON PIRACY. PRASONG SKETCHED THE HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF PIRACY IN THE GULF, NOTING THAT THAI FISHERMEN THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED. ENFORCEMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS. EVEN WITHOUT FOREIGN AID,

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THAILAND HAD WORKED TO SUPPRESS PIRACY IN HER TERRITORIAL WATERS. HE CONFIRMED THAT IF MORE RESOURCES ARE MADE AVAILABLE, THAILAND WOULD BE ABLE TO OPERATE MORE REGULARLY IN THAI WATERS AND EVEN OUTSIDE OF TERRITORIAL WATERS. PRASONG NOTED STRONGLY THAT IN TALKS WITH UNHCR OVER THE DOLLARS 3.67 MILLION PROGRAM, THE THAI HAVE SAID THEY WILL ACT WITH THEIR OWN PERSONNEL AND METHODS. HE COULD NOT SAY WHEN THIS PROGRAM WOULD START BUT EXPECTED A DRAFT TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT FROM UNHCR IMMINENTLY.

14. ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PIRACY PATROLS, PRASONG GAVE AS HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT THAILAND IS NOT THE ONLY COUNTRY ON THE GULF AND THAT SENDING INTERNATIONAL SHIPS TO PATROL WOULD REQUIRE CONSULTATION WITH OTHER GULF STATES, INCLUDING VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. SUCH PATROLS MIGHT ALSO ACT AS AN INDUCEMENT TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF BOAT PEOPLE. HE NOTED THREE RELATED ISSUES:

- A NEED FOR DISCUSSION WITH LITTORAL STATES;
- A NEED TO DECIDE WHERE REFUGEES WOULD BE FUNNELED:

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THAILAND, MALAYSIA OR BACK TO VIETNAM;
 -- THAILAND'S OBJECTION TO FOREIGN FLAG PATROLS IN ITS 200 MILE ECONOMIC ZONE.

15. THUS, IN PRASONG'S VIEW AN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PIRACY PROGRAM HAS EXTRA-HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS. ALTHOUGH THAILAND COULD CONSIDER IT, OTHER NATIONS MUST BE INVOLVED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY SOLARZ, PRASONG SAID THAT HE DID NOT OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE IDEA OF RESUMING TRAINING FLIGHTS BY USN AIRCRAFT OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AS A MEANS OF SPOTTING PIRATE ATTACKS BUT HE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER IT FURTHER. WHEN MR. SOLARZ ASKED HOW THE THAI WOULD USE ADDITIONAL ANTI-PIRACY FUNDING IF IT WERE MADE AVAILABLE, PRASONG RECALLED THAT THE RTG HAD ALREADY GIVEN A LIST OF THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT THAILAND WOULD NEED FOR EXPANDED ANTI-PIRACY PATROLS TO FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS HOLTZMAN; HE PROMISED TO FORWARD A COPY TO MR. SOLARZ FOR RE-CONSIDERATION.

16. SOLARZ ASKED FOR THAI VIEWS ON A PROPOSAL TO STATION A NUMBER OF TRAWLERS IN THE MOST DANGEROUS AREA OF THE GULF AS AN ANTI-PIRACY MEASURE. SAROU NOTED THAT THE THAI COULD CONSIDER SUCH AN IDEA BUT COULD NOT COMMENT WITHOUT KNOWING THE DETAILS. HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH TRAWLERS WOULD ALSO BE STATIONED IN VIETNAMESE WATERS. AMBASSADOR DEAN POINTED OUT THAT AN ESSENTIAL QUESTION WOULD BE WHETHER RESETTLEMENT NATIONS WOULD AGREE THAT REFUGEES AIDED BY SUCH A SCHEME WOULD BE RESETTLED PROMPTLY.

REFUGEES

17. SOLARZ EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ACCEPT ANOTHER GROUP OF KHMER FOR RESETTLEMENT SOON. HE OUTLINED HIS EARLIER ROLE WITH SENATOR DOLE IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF 15 THOUSAND KHMER FROM THE POL POT PERIOD. HE EMPHASIZED HIS HOPE THAT ANY PROGRAM OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF KHMER BE TRULY VOLUNTARY AND THAT THOSE WHO DECLINE TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA

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BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESETTLE ELSEWHERE.

18. SQUADRON LEADER PRASONG OUTLINED THAI HOPES TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF KHMER IN REFUGEE CAMPS. HE NOTED THAT ABOUT 90,000 KHMER ARE IN HOLDING CENTERS AND 200,000 IN BORDER CONCENTRATIONS. HE OBSERVED THAT KHMER DIFFER FROM LAO AND VIETNAMESE IN THAT FEWER HAVE RELATIVES IN THIRD COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT BE ANCHORS FOR RESETTLEMENT. HE HAS DISCUSSED VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WITH UNHCR. UNHCR'S RIZVI TOLD HIM THAT THE PRK FOREIGN MINISTER HAD AGREED TO VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT KHMER NOT RPT NOT STAY ALONG THE BORDER. IF THE US AGREES TO ACCEPT ABOUT 30,000 KHMER THAT WOULD REDUCE THE CAMP POPULATION TO ABOUT 40-50,000, MOST OF WHOM HOPEFULLY WOULD OPT FOR VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION.

19. PRASONG ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO APPEAL FOR SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE HMONG AND LOWLAND LAO REFUGEES, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN IN THAILAND FOR YEARS. HE ASKED THAT PRIORITY GO FIRST TO THEM, THEN TO KHMER, AND THEN TO THE SMALL NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE, NOW DOWN TO SEVERAL THOUSAND. MR. SOLARZ PROMISED TO HELP TO THE EXTENT HE COULD. PRASONG ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THE VIETNAMESE LAND PEOPLE IN THAILAND WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RELEASED FOR RESETTLEMENT ABROAD. FINALLY, HE NOTED WITH APPRECIATION THAT AMBASSADOR DEAN HAD PRESENTED HIM WITH A CHECK FOR DOLS 500,000 A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY (THE FINAL FY 1981 US ESF PROGRAM TRANCHE) FOR AFFECTED THAI.

MISCELLANEOUS

20. ASKED THE THAI VIEW OF CHEMICAL WARFARE, MARSHAL SIITHI SAID HE BELIEVED THE VIETNAMESE ARE USING "YELLOW RAIN" AND IS PLEASED THE UNITED STATES IS DEVOTING ATTENTION TO THE MATTER. HE NOTED THAT HARD EVIDENCE IS OFTEN HARD TO OBTAIN, ESPECIALLY AS THE VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO BE MUDDYING THE ISSUE BY DROPPING HARMLESS YELLOW MATERIAL ON OCCASION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE LEAD SHOULD STAY WITH THE US; THAILAND HAS COOPERATED BY MAKING

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INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS AND BY GRANTING ACCESS TO INVESTIGATORS. THAILAND, HOWEVER, WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONFRONT VIETNAM ON THIS DIRECTLY AND, HE IMPLIED, WILL CONTINUE ITS PRESENT APPROACH.

21. THE THAI SAID THEY HAD NOT YET COMPLETED A COORDINATED ANALYSIS OF THE RECENTLY-CONCLUDED VIETNAM COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS. HOWEVER, THE ECONOMY OBVIOUSLY SEEMS TO BE A PROBLEM, AND SOME DISPUTE SEEMS EVIDENT IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH MAY HAVE PUT LIMITS ON ITS AID TO VIETNAM. THUS, THE THAI SUGGESTED, FOREIGN MINISTER THACH HAS GONE TO EUROPE HOPING FOR AID FROM EUROPEAN STATES AND JAPAN. VIETNAMESE RHETORIC AT THE CONGRESS SOUGHT TO SHOW THAT THE SRV IS FRIENDLY TOWARD THAILAND. OVERALL, THE CHANGES THE CONGRESS SET IN MOTION ARE GRADUAL, NOT DRAMATIC.

22. MR. SOLARZ DID NOT SEE THIS MESSAGE

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BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

DEAN

END OF MESSAGE

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